INTRODUCTION 24
Recent decades have seen great interest in social cognition and its evolution, due largely 25 to the non-trivial nature of such abilities (e.g., putting one's self in others' shoes), as well 26 as the idea that coping with social challenges may underlie the evolution of general 27 intelligence (Shettleworth 2010) . Indeed the latter suggestion, known as the 'social 28 intelligence hypothesis ' (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Byrne and Whiten 1988) , relies 29 heavily on the finding that species exhibiting advanced cognitive abilities often maintain 30 elaborate social structures. While this hypothesis initially referred to humans and other 31
primates, it has also been related to advanced cognition in other species, including 32 corvids (Emery and Clayton 2004) , hyenas (Holekamp 2007) , and cetaceans (Marino 33 2002) . However, regardless of such elaborate social structures, group-living animals face 34 a more fundamental challenge which is often ignored in this context: social foraging 35 (Giraldeau and Caraco 2000) . 36
37
Foraging together for resources is a ubiquitous feature of group living, observed across 38 taxa from insects to humans; it is perhaps one of the most common forms of social 39 interaction, as it spans fundamental aspects of life such as food and shelter. Social 40 foraging interactions have been framed in terms of the producer-scrounger (PS) game, in 41 which individuals have the option either to produce (i.e. independently search for) 42 resources, or scrounge them from producers (Barnard and Sibly 1981; Barnard 1984; 43 Giraldeau and Caraco 2000; Giraldeau and Dubois 2008) . 44
45
While scrounging saves the time and energy that must be invested in order to produce 46 resources, it requires a sufficiently high frequency of producers in the population to be 47 beneficial. The negative, frequency-dependent selection operating on these two strategies 48 results in a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) (Barnard and Sibly 1981; Barnard 49 1984; Giraldeau and Caraco 2000; Giraldeau and Dubois 2008) . In such populations, 50 selection can be strong enough to give rise to a suite of scrounging-avoidance tactics by 51 producers, and consequent counter-tactics by scroungers (Barnard 1984; Coussi-Korbel 52 1994; Emery and Clayton 2001; Flynn and Giraldeau 2001; Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002; 53 Held et al. 2002; Bugnyar and Heinrich 2006; Shaw and Clayton 2013) . Thus, selection 54 on social foragers to outsmart each other can lead to an intraspecific evolutionary arms 55 race (Dawkins and Krebs 1979) that results in increased cognitive abilities (Barnard 56 1984; Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002; Grodzinski and Clayton 2010) . 57
58
In many species of social foragers, the PS game may have selected for cognitive 59 adaptations that involve plastic responses to the presence of others (an 'audience effect') 60 (Barnard 1984; Byrne and Whiten 1988; Coussi-Korbel 1994; Norris and Freeman 2000; 61 Emery and Clayton 2001; Flynn and Giraldeau 2001; Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002; Held 62 et al. 2002; Bugnyar and Heinrich 2006; Shaw and Clayton 2013) . For example, in spice 63 finches, as well as pigs and gorillas, producers keep their distance from potential 64 scroungers (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Flynn and Giraldeau 2001; Held et al. 2002) ; in 65 mangabeys and chimpanzees, producers lead scroungers away from food (Byrne and 66 Whiten 1988; Coussi-Korbel 1994) ; scrub jays return to re-cache, in private, food items 67 they have been observed by conspecifics to have been hiding (Emery and Clayton 2001);
Eurasian jays attempt to prevent auditory information of their caching activities from 69 reaching potential scroungers (Shaw and Clayton 2013); scrounging ravens watch 70 caching from a distance and delay their approach until the cacher (producer) has left 71 (Bugnyar and Heinrich 2006) , and scrounging chimpanzees may hide to watch 72 conspecifics recover food, and emerge from hiding to steal it (Byrne and Whiten 1988) . 73
While success in the PS game may be influenced by a number of traits, from body size to 74 dominance ranking (Giraldeau and Beauchamp 1999) , these observations suggest that 75 potential targets for adaptation are likely to include data-processing and decision-making 76 abilities. However, the cognition underlying such abilities is likely to entail a cost, which 77 may be developmental, physiological and/or derived from prolonged data processing (e.g. 78 Burger et al. 2008) . 79 80 Here, we examine the conditions under which mutations in the cognitive apparatus that 81 increase performance in the PS game provide sufficient benefit to outweigh such costs, 82
and analyze the consequences of evolving general versus strategy-specific cognitive 83 abilities. As the nature of the cognitive abilities involved in the aforementioned examples 84 is far from clear, it is impossible to model them in any detail without restricting the 85 generality of the model. To avoid this, we model these cognitive abilities simply as traits 86 affecting the performance of producers and scroungers competing against each other (as 87 detailed below). Consequently, our model is in fact much more general, and concerns any 88 such traits. 89
90

MODEL AND RESULTS 92
We model a population of social foragers playing the PS game. We consider both the 93 case of individuals playing pure social foraging strategies, and the more realistic case of 94 mixed strategies. For simplicity we describe the pure strategy model first, and then 95 extend it to include mixed strategies. 96
97
Basic model and the scrounging success probability function 98
Each generation consists of multiple rounds of foraging, and in each round some fraction 99 of producers finds food and receives a payoff. A producer that finds food experiences 100 scrounging attempts with probability f, which, if scrounging is successful, causes the 101 payoff to be evenly split between the scrounger and the producer. The probability that a 102 scrounging attempt is successful, σ , is determined by the difference d in cognitive 103 abilities between the scrounger and the producer: scroungers with relatively advanced 104 cognitive abilities are more often successful at obtaining food, whereas producers with 105 relatively advanced abilities are more often successful at avoiding loss of food to 106 scroungers. It is then reasonable that should increase monotonically with the cognitive 107 difference d. We model this effect by assuming that σ is a logistic function of d:
. The parameter determines the size of the effect that 109 cognition has on scrounging success: it represents the lowest possible scrounging success 110 rate, which occurs when a producer has an infinitely higher cognitive level than a 111 scrounger (i.e.
). In other words, if a is large the influence of cognition should be 112 weak, as scrounging is then likely to succeed regardless of the exact difference in 113 cognitive abilities. We assume that the probability of successful scrounging is not 114
determined solely by cognitive abilities, but that these abilities are still significant in 115 determining scrounging success (i.e. 0 < a < 1 ). The parameter s determines the size of 116 the effect that a single cognitive mutation has on the probability of successful scrounging: 117 each mutation changes σ by ∼ s until it saturates at some maximum or minimum value for 118 sd >> 1 . The effects of these assumptions can be seen in Figure 1 , which shows 119 scrounging success probability as a function of d for different values of a and s. 120
121
Effect of cognitive mutations on fitness 122
Given the probability of scrounging success σ , the relative fitness advantage of a 123 mutation that changes producers' cognitive ability by δ is given by 124 
128
To be advantageous, the potential benefits of cognition-increasing mutations in relation to 129 the PS game must outweigh their cost (corresponding roughly to s >> γ ), which we will 130 assume in what follows. However, this does not guarantee that increasing cognition is 131 always favored, because the advantage of a mutation that increases cognitive ability in a 132 producer (scrounger) depends on its current cognitive level relative to scroungers 133 (producers) (Fig.2) . When scroungers are slightly smarter than producers (i.e. d is small 134 and positive), producers are selected to increase their cognitive level. When producers are 135 slightly smarter than scroungers (d is small and negative) scroungers are selected to 136 increase their cognitive level. Thus, small differences in cognitive level support an 137
evolutionary arms race between social foraging strategies (Fig. 2) . On the other hand, 138 cognitive differences that are too large have remarkably different consequences. If the 139 producers are substantially smarter than the scroungers (d is large and negative), or vice 140 versa (d is large and positive), the probability of successful scrounging, σ, is only slightly 141 affected by further mutations, because it is close to either of its asymptotic values (a or 1, 142 respectively). Since the benefit of an increased cognitive level is low in such cases, it is 143 outweighed by the cost, and selection will favor decreased cognitive levels (Fig. 2) . 144
145
Effect of specialized vs. generalized cognition on the race 146
We consider two possibilities for the influence of cognition on the PS game. In the 147 generalized cognition model (GCM), a single cognitive trait, 'C', determines both the 148 ability to successfully scrounge and the ability to avoid being scrounged when producing. 149
In the specialized cognition model (SCM), one trait, 'Cs', determines scrounging ability, 150 while another, 'Cp', determines the ability of producers to avoid being scrounged. 151
Comparing both types of models analytically and using agent-based simulations, we 152
show that the SCM is unable to support a consistent arms race and results either in 153 scroungers' extinction or in a race to decrease cognitive level (a 'backwards race'). The 154 GCM, in contrast, exhibits persistent arms races, a result independent of the specific 155 conditions. 156 population commences at some baseline cognitive level, labeled 'level 0' for 161 convenience. A generation consists of T repeated foraging interactions as described 162 above, and at each interaction scroungers are randomly assigned to successful producers 163 (one scrounger per producer); the probability of successful scrounging at each interaction 164 is determined by the relative cognition of the specific producer and scrounger involved, 165 using the aforementioned function σ (d) . Mutations increasing (+1) or decreasing (-1) 166 cognitive level, as well as mutations in social foraging strategy (transforming a producer 167 into a scrounger or vice versa) occur randomly at a low rate, µ, at each generation. The 168 number of offspring per individual is set probabilistically, based on the relative payoff 169 accumulated through its lifetime (see SI section 2 for full details of the simulations). 170
171
In a population initially made up of individuals with equal cognitive abilities, the 172 scroungers' relevant cognitive ability (C in the GCM, Cs in the SCM) typically increases 173 in either type of model (Fig. 3) . This increases the probability that scrounging is 174 successful, intensifying the selective pressure on producers to avoid being scrounged and 175 leading producers' relevant cognitive ability (C in the GCM, Cp in the SCM) to rise. 176 Improved producer cognitive ability, in turn, puts pressure on scroungers to re-adapt, and 177 the consequent positive feedback loop leads to a continuous evolution of increased 178 cognitive abilities in both producer and scrounger populations (Fig. 3) . The rate of this 179 increase depends on the rate and magnitude of cognitive mutations: higher mutation rates 180 and higher values of s result in faster-evolving races (see SI). In the SCM, the escalation 181 in relevant cognitive abilities is accompanied by a decrease in the unused cognitive 182 abilities (Cs for producers, Cp for scroungers), due to their cost.
184
Such arms races occur in both the GCM and the SCM, and are temporarily stable as long 185 as cognitive differences between foraging types are small, consistent with our analysis 186 above showing that small d values support an evolutionary arms race. However, the arms 187 race is interrupted when either foraging type acquires a large cognitive advantage over 188 the other ( sd >> 1 ); such an advantage emerges stochastically due to the random 189 processes in the simulation and finite population size. If producers have a sufficiently 190 large advantage, the (unsuccessful) scroungers cannot obtain resources and are driven to 191 extinction. Once this happens, they can only reappear through mutation that converts a 192 producer into a scrounger. In the SCM, such mutants will have the high Cp and low Cs 193 values typical of producers, but since this makes them unfit as scroungers, scroungers 194 cannot recover from extinction ( Fig. 3a) . In the GCM, however, a mutant's high 195 cognitive ability C, inherited from its producer parent, will make it a good scrounger. 196
This enables scroungers to re-invade the population, reestablishing the cognitive arms 197 race from the current cognitive level of the population (Fig. 3b) . 198 199 A large cognitive advantage for scroungers, in contrast, will not lead producers to 200 extinction, due to the frequency-dependence of the PS game. Instead, mutations that 201 decrease producers' cognitive level will be favored because the benefits in reducing 202 cognitive costs will outweigh their effect on scrounging-avoidance success (which is 203 minimal under these conditions since scroungers are much smarter). Once producers' 204 cognitive levels are reduced, selection will act on the scroungers to follow suit for similar 205 cost-saving reasons, resulting in a 'backwards' race. This 'backwards' race scenario islikely to occur and escalate in SCM populations (Fig. 3c ), but in GCM populations a 207 large cognitive advantage for scroungers will quickly be reduced by scroungers mutating 208 into producers while retaining their high C levels, thus reestablishing the race. 209
210
Mixed strategies 211
So far we have considered pure producers and pure scroungers. In nature, however, the 212 PS trait is usually manifested as a mixed strategy, and individuals have been observed to 213 employ both strategies to varying degrees based on their previous experience and on 214 social and environmental conditions (Mottley and Giraldeau 2000; Katsnelson et al. 215 2008; Morand-Ferron and Giraldeau 2010; Katsnelson et al. 2011) . In simulations of both 216 of our models, inclusion of mixed strategies yields qualitatively similar results to those 217 described above: GCM races persist, while SCM races are bound to collapse. As in the 218 pure-strategy case of the SCM, gaps between Cp and Cs arise stochastically. If Cs 219 becomes much larger than Cp, the latter decreases (as in the pure case) to avoid cognitive 220 costs, resulting in a 'backwards race' (Fig. 3d) . If Cp becomes much larger than Cs, 221 selection favors foraging strategies that produce as often as possible, and scrounging 222 disappears from the population (Fig. 3e) , as in the pure case. This disappearance of 223 scrounging from the population as its adaptive value decreases is plausible given that in 224 nature, social foraging strategies can be adjusted to provide better solutions for changing 225 environmental conditions (Mottley and Giraldeau 2000) . 226 227 228
Ending the race 230
As shown above, arms races involving general cognitive abilities are not limited by the 231 instability and short-life typical of those involving specialized cognition. However, it 232 does not follow that these arms races will continue forever. For example, when cognition-233 costs become too high compared to their benefits the population may go extinct. As costs 234 become too high the population may also become prone to invasion by migrants with 235 baseline cognitive levels; such an invasion is possible because these migrants, despite 236 their poor cognitive abilities, do relatively well altogether as they do not suffer such high 237 cognitive costs. In this case, a cyclic pattern of escalation and collapse may emerge, as 238 the population repeatedly regresses to the cognitive baseline and then restarts the arms 239 race (Fig 3f) . Alternatively, a general cognitive ability may co-evolve with other traits 240 (such as foraging efficiency or diet, in our case), changing the very parameters 241 considered here that govern the evolution of social cognition. Interestingly, increased 242 general cognition resulting from the race may have pleiotropic benefits, such as enabling 243 the exploitation of new food sources or habitats, which could themselves outweigh the 244 costs of cognition. Conversely, if producers become better at exploiting food sources, 245 producing may become much more profitable than scrounging. The consequent low 246 frequency of scroungers will make the PS game less important, slowing down the 247 cognitive arms race or drawing it to an end. 248
Our results suggest that a cognitive arms race improving performance of players in the 251 producer-scrounger game can persist and escalate, but only if it involves a generalcognitive ability competing against itself. Arms races between two separate abilities may 253 escalate temporarily, but are bound to collapse. In the present formulation, the increased 254 stability of arms races, when they involve generalized rather than specialized cognitive 255 abilities, is independent of the specific details of our model. Indeed, arms races involving 256 a single trait should generally be more stable than those between two (or more) traits that 257 mutate and evolve separately, since destabilizing asymmetries will arise less frequently in 258 the former. That intra-species arms races should tend to persist for longer than inter-259 species ones is one possible implication. Schaik 2006). However, maintaining a large body to an extent that will make a difference 289 in success in the game most probably requires greater energy than maintaining a 290 cognitive tweak that will achieve the same difference. In other words, it seems likely that 291 cognitive mutations that improve foragers performance in the PS game will tend to cost 292 less than an increase in body size or aggressive behavior that could provide the same 293 improvement. Thus, while our model describes a scenario applicable to many traits, 294 cognition may be one of the few for which the benefit and cost parameters fall in the 295 region supporting an arms race. 296
297
We have seen that the arms race in a trait is only stable if the trait contributes to both 298 scrounging and scrounging-avoidance; what general cognitive abilities, then, might serve 299 both of these tactics? The requirement that the ability must be useful for such distinct 300 behaviors strongly suggests some form of social cognition. An example consistent with 301 our model is the strategies used by some corvid species to protect food-caches from being 302 scrounged and to successfully pilfer others' caches. It has been suggested that these 303 strategies involve a general cognitive ability, and perhaps even some form of In the following analysis, we will assume that mutations are sufficiently rare ( nµ << 1 ) 27 that there is a separation of timescales. Each foraging type is usually fixed for a single 28 cognitive level, and producers and scroungers are present in the population at the 29 equilibrium frequency determined by the difference in cognitive levels. Occasionally, a 30 mutation occurs that changes either an individual's cognitive ability (by one level) or its 31 foraging type. If the mutation initially confers a selective advantage $, it has a chance to 32 escape drift and increase in frequency in the population. We assume that if it does so, it 33 fixes and the frequency of scroungers relaxes to its new equilibrium value before the next 34 mutation occurs. We now find the equilibrium frequency of scroungers (note that this is 35 always complemented by the frequency of producers). 36
37
We assume that each scrounger independently chooses a producer with food from which 38 it attempts to scrounge, but that if multiple scroungers choose the same producer, only 39 one can actually make a scrounging attempt. (This is the same model as in the simulation 40 section 2.1.2 below.) Since there are n! scroungers and n!(1!" ) producers with food, 41 the probability f that a producer that finds food will face a scrounging attempt is 42
, and the probability that, in a given foraging step, a scrounger 43 will find a producer with food that is also available to be scrounged from is f !(1!") / " . 44
(2) 47
The two foraging types then have relative fitnesses (up to an overall normalizing 48 constant) w P and w S given by their expected payoffs, adjusted for the cost of cognition: 49
51
The equilibrium frequency of scroungers, ! ! , is the value of ! at which w P = w S ; 53 scroungers go extinct if w P (! = 0) > w S (! = 0) . 54
55
In order to find a simple approximate expression for ! ! , note that for scroungers to be 56 maintained in the population, it must not be too easy for producers to find food, i.e., " 57 must be small. Assuming that ! << " , we have f ! 1, and therefore from (3) and (4) 58
59
Further assuming that the cognitive gap is not likely to grow to levels such that it imposes 60 an enormous selective disadvantage, we have !d << 1, and we can further approximate 61
(6) 62 Figure S1 shows the accuracy of this approximation.
64
Selective coefficients of mutations 65
As stated in the main text, the selective advantage of a mutation increasing cognitive 66 abilities by ! is ! P (") for producers and ! S (") for scroungers, where ! P and ! S are 67
given by: 68
We assume that scroungers are at a frequency ! ! >> " , so that f ! 1 in the above 71 equations. Further assuming that each mutation has only a small effect on scrounging 72 probability or cognitive cost ( s! << 1 and !" << 1), the right-hand sides of (7) and (8) 73 are approximately given by the first-order Taylor expansions in ! : 74
75 In populations experiencing a stable cognitive arms race, the gap between the cognitive 81 levels of the two foraging types settles down to a roughly steady value d ! at which bothconsidering, this rate is given by the mutation supply times the probability that mutants 84 with a cognitive ability increased by one unit (! = +1 ) will fix. Assuming that ! P (1) and 85 ! S (1) are small compared to one, the probability of fixation is only 2! (Ewens 2004) . 86
The two foraging types therefore evolve higher cognition at the same rate when 87
. (11) 89 Inserting the above expression (6) for ! ! , and (9) and (10) for ! P and ! S , and assuming 90 that food is hard to find ( ! << 1), this reduces to
When the cost of cognition is low (! << s ), the expression simplifies further to d ! 2 / s! , 93
and we find that the rates of advance balance at a cognitive gap of 94
95 corresponding to a probability of scrounging success ! ! 0.9 . This is illustrated in Figure  96 S3, where the blue and purple curves intersect at d ! 2/s. At this value of d, both 97 producers and scroungers accumulate cognitive mutations at a rate of approximately 98 Above, we have focused on asexual populations of individuals following pure producing 107 or scrounging strategies. We now consider the opposite limit, in which nearly all 108 individuals follow a single mixed foraging strategy, scrounging with probability ! and 109 producing with probability 1!! . Equivalently, we can consider a sexual population of 110 individuals following pure strategies with frequent recombination between the foraging 111 locus and the cognition locus or loci. In both cases, producer-scrounger interactions will 112 typically occur between individuals with the same cognitive genotype, and cognitive 113 mutations will, on average, be present in an individual acting as a scrounger with 114 frequency ! , and in an individual acting as a producer with frequency 1!! . We will 115 continue to assume that the dynamics of the foraging strategy locus are fast, so that the 116 scrounging frequency can be approximated by its equilibrium value given the current 117 cognitive genotype of the population, ! = ! (for the mixed strategy case, this means that 118 we assume that the population is at the evolutionarily stable foraging strategy). 119
120
In this case, the selective coefficients on cognitive mutations of size ! are 121 
The producer-scrounger game 151
The lifetime of one generation included a series of 50 PS interactions, or steps, which 152 were independent of each other and their order unimportant. This number of steps was 153 chosen in order to allow foragers to interact with a large sample of the population. At the 154 beginning of each step, all foragers draw a PS strategy according to their F genotype, and 155 those who play producer receive a set payoff (e.g. 4, although the value does not matter) 156 at a probability of 0.25. This probability was set to introduce a cost to the producer 157 strategy and to allow an effective PS game. Foragers who play scrounger are then 158 assigned randomly and independently to producers who found food. We assume only one 159 scrounger can join each successful producer, and therefore if two or more scroungers are 160 assigned to the same producer, only one of them will be able to attempt scrounging. setting scrounging success probability to 1, such populations evolve a PS ratio fluctuating 166 around 0.5:0.5. Scrounging success baseline probability, a, used to calculate the 167 probability of successful scrounging ! (d) , was set to 0.5 in all simulations, to allow for a 168 stable producer-scrounger game under simulation conditions on one hand, and for 169 cognition to play a significant role in determining the probability of successful 170 scrounging on the other. Increasing the value of a will result in lower collapse rates in the 171 SCM; however, this contributes little to how cognitive abilities affect scrounging success 172 and we therefore ignore it here. 173 174
Selection and reproduction 175
After completing 50 interactions, the foragers reproduce asexually, in proportion to their 176 relative lifetime accumulated payoff, and immediately die (population size remains 177 constant). Offspring are genetically identical to their parent, but for mutations, which 178 occur in all genes at a rate of µ = n !10 . Mutations in the F gene change it within the 179 simulation's defined allele pool. In the cognition genes, a mutation changes the mutated 180 allele by one level, either increasing (+1) or decreasing it (-1). We allow the population to 181 evolve for 10,000 generations; under each parameter set, we repeated the simulation 100 182 We assume that a higher cognitive level incurs a cost, which may be developmental, 224 physiological or derive from the possibly longer processing times associated with high 225 cognitive levels. We use a cost proportional to the agent's cognitive level, which is a 226 fractional deduction from the final accumulated payoff. For example, maintaining 227 cognitive level 10 resulted in deductions of 10% of payoff, regardless of PS strategy. 228 Unsurprisingly, setting the cost to 0 ( Figure S4a ) resulted in faster races (compare to 229 Figure S4b ). In SCM populations, it also caused the cognition genes which were 230 irrelevant to the foraging strategy (Cs for producers and Cp for scroungers) to drift rather 231 than decrease, as there was no selection acting on them in either direction. Additionally, 232 
